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Textuality and 
the Ends of Modernity 
Hugh J. Silverman 
History reveals its "ironic" essence: 
interpretation and distortion, or 
dis-location, characterize not only 
the relation of thought to the mes-
sages of the past but also the rela-
tion of one "epoch" to the others 
G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity (180) 
Review-essay on Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity. Trans. and with an 
introduction by Jon R. Snyder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
While Gianni Vattimo does not embark upon the theme of 
weak thought [il pensiero debole] in his 1985 Fine della Modernita 
(now available in English), the context for his account of nonfoun-
dational thinking is carefully set. Indeed, The End of Modernity can 
be regarded as a backdrop for this aspect of postmodernism that 
is now quite generally associated with Vattimo in Italy and increas-
ingly in the English-speaking world as well. "Weak thought" is 
a kind of thinking that is set off against "strong thought"-rigid, 
prestructured, grounded, foundational thought. Il pensiero debole 
operates at the limits of those teleological, eschatological, 
metaphysical, and even transcendental modes of cognition that 
have become the groundworks of modernity. Il pensiero debole offers 
an ironized alternative and yet not a counterpoint to "strong 
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thought." "Weak thought" moves "strong thought" to its limits, 
delimits it, but does not substitute for it. Pensiero debate is "strong 
thought" radicalized, taken to its extremes, undermined by its 
own self-delimitations. 
What one finds in The End of Modernity is a fully articulated 
reading of how Nietzsche and Heidegger-but also on occasion 
Adorno and Benjamin-account for a modernity that sets limits 
to the epochal notion itself . Modernity is identified, circumscribed, 
and enframed by the positions that Nietzsche and Heidegger an-
nounce. Like Nietzsche's "Madman" (proclaiming the death of 
God in the Gay Science) or like Heidegger's Rilke (announcing an 
end to the destitute time that his Holderlin had already identified 
earlier in "Wozu Dichter?"), Vattimo's reading delineates the traces 
of modernity, setting a frame to itself. Thus the task of a reading 
of the end of modernity will necessitate an account of modernity 
and the Verwindung that affirms its self-circumscription. That the 
self-circumscription is developed in terms of Heidegger's notion 
of Ge-stell will require greater elaboration, and the function of this 
Ge-stell as setting the frame for a theoretical practice of textuality 
will have to be put to the test of even further scrutiny. 
2. MODERNITY 
What does Vattimo mean by modernity and why does he 
eschew the term "modernism"? Modernity is that acceptance of 
a concept of the new, of progress, of the individual mind or subject 
which exhibits its uniqueness in science, art, and religion. Modern-
ity is reassuring, constructive, hopeful, meaning-laden, and real-
ity-referring. When modernity is represented in novels such as 
those of Joyce, Woolf, and Kafka, its constitution is always with 
a view to showing how things are-as well as to what is shown in the 
showing . With modernity, there is an "outside," "external" world 
which is "out there" waiting to be described. With modernity, 
subjectivity constitutes itself as the other-other than objectivity 
and often other than itself . Alterity, alienation, self-objectification 
-these features of modernity abound in modern philosophy, liter-
ature, and science. 
Modernism, in contrast to modernity, is a school of thought 
and artistic practice that goes beyond romanticism, realism, 
naturalism in favor of a futurist, cubist, stream of consciousness 
style of writing, painting, thinking. Modernism is the cult of the 
"new"; modernism goes in search of the shocking and the forward-
looking; modernism is the very discovery of the twentieth century . 
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Modernity, however, is a way of being that constitutes itself 
over against the classical and the traditional. To be modem is to 
be something special, but also to be thoroughly ordinary at the 
same time. "Modem Times"-as the Charlie Chaplin film came 
to identify it-is the affirmation of a world in which the subject 
seeks to affirm itself over against the ordinary, mundane, and 
habitual. 
So what would it mean for Gianni Vattimo to speak of the 
"end of modernity"? Modem thought has, for a long time, under-
stood its own limitations. Modem thought-in the grand tradition, 
a tradition that affirms the position of the subject as founded, 
grounded, and central by virtue of its constituting activities-seeks 
to delineate and delimit that to which it has access. 
As an empiricism, modem thought was bound to what it 
could experience directly, without mediation, or resolve. As a 
rationalism, it reached out to that which can be provided by 
reason, clarity and distinctness, certainty and justification. At the 
same time that Vico found limits to the "modem," Cartesian way 
of thinking (asserting a "new" science-and hence another mod-
ernism), he also sought after the "true Homer" through the agency 
of a rhetoric of poetic wisdom. Poetic wisdom would get out of 
the limits that Cartesian subjectivity circumscribed for itself. 
Even though Hegel brought subjectivity back into the context 
of a search for Absolute Mind, Hegelian thought nevertheless 
incorporates a magnificent rhetoric that brings together the con-
tradictions of subjectivity and objectivity into an all-encompassing 
story. While Hegel's history moves in stages-as does Vico's-his 
orientation is toward a greater inclusion. What Hegel missed was 
the doubling of the transcendental and the empirical that Kant 
(in the eighteenth century) founded and that Husserl (in the twen-
tieth) rediscovered. Nevertheless, Hegel was extremely conscious 
of the ends of philosophical activity. "End" in this sense could 
only mean "achievement," "accomplishment," "fulfillment"-a 
bringing to completion of that which had been started at some 
moment in time, but which could still realize itself in philosophical 
practices that reiterated, repeated, and reaffirmed all that Absolute 
Thought had accomplished. 
3. THE END OF MODERNITY 
The "end of modemity"-as Vattimo articulates it-can come 
only after a crisis. Husserl's" crisis of the European sciences" in the 
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1930s brought the recognition that the whole Cartesian-Kantian-
and even Husserlian-program could not go on forever. 
What Vico-Hegel, and later Foucault, were able to show was 
that modernity has inscribed within it the very limitation to its 
own success. The Vico-Hegel-Foucault complex is well aware that 
modern thought cannot be understood apart from narrative, poe-
tics, and historicality. But the poetics of human history are neces-
sarily interrupted at various stages-or what Vattimo calls 
"epochs." The Vico-Hegel-Foucault account remarks on the 
breaks, discontinuities, and thresholds that mark off the ages of 
human history. In this sense, however, it affirms many "ends," 
many places of termination, many moments of conclusion and 
reformation 
The Deleuzean rhizomatic exuberance and the Derridean dis-
semination unmark any particular end as "the end." They distrib-
ute unevenly the multiplicity of ends into a variety of contexts, 
formulations, and discursive practices. They read "end" in many 
texts-all circumscribing the text of modernity. And these "ends" 
indicate places where "something new" will come to replace the 
old, succeed the old, give new identity to the difference that has 
inscribed itself at the end of a framework. But what they replace 
is not a rejection of the former, not a discarding of the old, not a 
new beginning, but rather a reinscription back into the old as that 
which is radically other than the old. 
4. THE INSCRIPTION OF DIFFERENCES 
Somewhere between Nietzsche and Heidegger, and some-
where between the Vico-Hegel-Foucault complex on the one hand 
and the Descartes-Kant-Husserl lineage on the other, Vattimo 
inscribes the "end of modernity" thesis. The Descartes-Kant-Hus-
serl genealogy identifies modernity with the subject-object 
dualism that eventually takes the shape of what Foucault calls an 
"empirico-transcendental doublet." The Vico-Hegel-Foucault 
complex finds that modernity only enters the scene in the 
eighteenth century-with Vico himself, with Kant. But the begin-
ning of modernity carries with it its very end. 
The frame of modernity is outlined and predetermined along 
with its very inception. Hence Vattimo's reading of Nietzsche is 
one that stresses the genealogical, epochal, and markedly colorful 
character of the modernist achievement. While the epochal colors 
are somewhat somber, patterned at twilight and sunset, 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra is often cognizant of brilliance and light. 
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Similarly-and in a moment of repetition-the movement of mod-
ernist Italian futurism and De Chirico's colorful shapes provide 
an image of Nietzschean modernity. And while the Schopenhau-
erian pessimism of an Edvard Munch and the social critique of a 
Max Beckmann are another side of the Nietzschean panorama, 
they are only that part that necessitates the call to the end of 
modernity . 
The facets of modernity near its end are multiform and many-
hued. Their display and distribution are their surfaces and dis-
semination . Between Nietzsche and Foucault, the moments of 
critique mark off the writing of difference as the Being of beings, 
as the ontological difference. Between them, end acquires an iden-
tity of its own, and that identity is "difference ." 
The Nietzschean appeal to a "revaluation of values" is the 
proclamation of an end, an epochal end, an end to which any 
successful Ubermensch would have to be committed. Following 
Nietzsche's "death of God" proclamation, Foucault's picture of the 
"death of man" is perhaps only a displaced repetition. And yet 
both narratives are part of the inscription of the end of modernity. 
What Vattimo inserts in between the Nietzsche/Foucault picture 
is the moment of Heidegger's Verwindung. For Vattimo, the in-
scribed moment is not so much an "overcoming" (Uberwindung)-
as Nietzsche might insist-though this is also part of Heidegger's 
story, but a "getting over" modernity (a Verwindung of modernity) . 
Modernity is like a wound that can be healed, a sickness that can 
be cured, an experience that can be brought to a conclusion. 
Heidegger's "overcoming" of metaphysics, his claims to the "end" 
of philosophy, and his assertions concerning the achievements of 
European nihilism all mark off the place where thinking needs to 
occur . 
Heidegger's Denken will have to operate at the end of 
metaphysics. Out of the forgetfulness-(Seins)Vergessenheit-that 
accompanies the preoccupation with the ontic, Heidegger calls 
for a reinscription of the meaning of the Being of beings, namely, 
the ontological difference in which thinking inscribes itself. Denken 
names, calls, invokes the meaning of the Being of beings out of 
forgetfulness. Heideggerian Denken is both a return to the hitherto 
unthought and an end to the metaphysics that is devoid of think-
ing. Heideggerian Denken operates in a differential spa ce. It is not 
comfortable with identities . Heideggerian Denken can only come 
into its own in the event of difference. Ereignis-which Vattimo 
discusses at length-is the event of appropriation, the happening 
HUGH J. SIL VER MAN 327 
of what is ownmost in the ontological difference. Ontological 
difference-the meaning of the Being of beings-marks out an 
open space in which Ereignis comes into its own. Ereignis is the 
happening of difference, the event of difference, the appropriation 
of difference. And in that space of difference Denken takes place. 
Vattimo's pensiero debole operates at the end of modernity, at 
that place of difference where a revaluation of values marks off 
the happening of Ereignis, where Denken becomes pensiero debole. 
Heideggerian Denken operates within a frame. Heidegger calls this 
frame the Ge-stell. The Ge-stell comes under many descriptions. It 
is sometimes called "a framework," as in the structure of some-
thing; sometimes it is a bodily form which gives shape to what it 
shapes; sometimes it is "technology," the forging into shape of 
that which would otherwise be shapeless; and sometimes it is a 
frame, as in a frame of a painting. For Heidegger, Denken cannot 
occur outside a frame, framework, or shape. Yet it also cannot be 
the determination of the content of what is framed. Denken requires 
difference, and difference needs to be enframed (as Ge-stell) in 
order for it to take shape. 
For Vattimo, the Ge-stell marks off modernity, inscribes differ-
ence within the frames of modernity. For Vattimo, Denken operates 
in the event of difference, in the Ereignis of the ontological differ-
ence where there is silence, where the call of Being can be heard, but 
heard without sound. This hearing without sound is the hermeneutic 
Verstehen that both Heidegger and Gadamer extoll. Verstehen-her-
meneutic understanding---occurs where difference is set by the Ge-
stell. And the Ge-stell marks off where the event of the meaning of 
the Being of beings happens. 
The Ge-stell is also where poetizing can occur-perhaps the 
other end of the poetizing that Vico had prophetically inscribed in 
his "new science." This poetizing is where modernity is brought to 
its ultimate achievement. As Vattimo points out, the achievement 
of poetizing is not an "overcoming" of modernity, but rather a 
Venvindung of modernity-Heideggerian poetizing is what happens 
in the ontological difference. 
In setting its own limits, in marking off its margins, in textualiz-
ing itself, modernity, in the sense that it has come to fulfill for itself, 
is brought to its limits, brought to its end. Its foundations are shown 
to be foundations within a context, within a frame. At the ends of 
modernity, foundations are dislocated and displaced. Vattimo's idea 
of a postfoundational thinking-a pensiero debole---operates at the 
limits of those founded activities that reaffirm the modern. Where 
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Heidegger notes a falling away from the ground (the Grund), where 
he indicates an Abgrund, an abyss, there Vattimo becomes aware of 
the adventures of difference, there pensiero debole comes into its own, 
circumscribing, marking off, enframing, setting a Ge-stell for the 
Venvindung, the self-delimitation of modernity . 
